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homelab-design/decisions/0030-mfa-yubikey-strategy.md
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- Accept ADR-0030 (MFA/YubiKey strategy)
2026-02-09 17:25:27 -05:00

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# MFA and Yubikey Strategy
* Status: accepted
* Date: 2026-02-04
* Deciders: Billy
* Technical Story: Enable hardware security key (Yubikey) authentication across homelab applications
## Context and Problem Statement
Password-only authentication is vulnerable to phishing and credential theft. Hardware security keys (Yubikeys) provide phishing-resistant authentication through WebAuthn/FIDO2. The homelab uses multiple authentication points:
1. **Authentik** - Central SSO for most applications
2. **Vaultwarden** - Password manager (independent auth)
How do we enable Yubikey support across these authentication points while maintaining usability?
## Decision Drivers
* Phishing-resistant authentication for sensitive applications
* Flexibility - support both hardware keys and TOTP
* User experience - single Yubikey works everywhere
* Fallback options - don't lock users out if key is lost
* Future-proof - support passkeys and newer standards
## Considered Options
1. **WebAuthn/FIDO2 for both Authentik and Vaultwarden**
2. **Yubikey OTP only**
3. **TOTP only (no hardware key support)**
## Decision Outcome
Chosen option: **Option 1 - WebAuthn/FIDO2 for both Authentik and Vaultwarden**
WebAuthn provides the best security (phishing-resistant) and user experience (touch to authenticate). Both Authentik and Vaultwarden support WebAuthn natively.
### Positive Consequences
* Phishing-resistant authentication
* Single Yubikey works for all applications
* No external dependencies (unlike Yubikey OTP)
* Supports passkeys for future passwordless auth
* Hardware-bound credentials can't be copied
### Negative Consequences
* Requires modern browser with WebAuthn support
* Users must have physical access to key
* Key loss requires recovery process
## Implementation Status
| Application | WebAuthn Support | Current Status | Action Required |
|-------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Authentik | ✅ Native | ✅ Implemented | Blueprint deployed via ConfigMap |
| Vaultwarden | ✅ Native | ✅ Implemented | None - WebAuthn enrolled |
## Authentik Configuration
### Current State
Authentik has WebAuthn support built-in. Users can already enroll devices via:
- Settings → MFA Devices → Enroll WebAuthn Device
### Required Configuration
#### 1. Create WebAuthn Authenticator Stage
In Admin → Flows & Stages → Stages:
**Stage: authenticator-webauthn-setup**
```
Type: Authenticator WebAuthn Setup Stage
Name: authenticator-webauthn-setup
User verification: preferred
Resident key requirement: preferred
Authenticator attachment: cross-platform
```
**Stage: authenticator-webauthn-validation**
```
Type: Authenticator Validation Stage
Name: authenticator-webauthn-validation
Device classes: WebAuthn, TOTP (allow both)
Not configured action: skip
```
#### 2. Bind to Authentication Flow
Edit the default authentication flow to include MFA:
```
Flow: default-authentication-flow
Stages (in order):
1. identification (username/email)
2. password
3. authenticator-webauthn-validation ← Add this
4. user-login
```
#### 3. Create MFA Enforcement Policies
**Policy: enforce-mfa-admins**
```python
# Expression Policy
# Requires WebAuthn for admins
if ak_is_group_member(request.user, name="homelab-admins"):
from authentik.stages.authenticator_webauthn.models import WebAuthnDevice
if not WebAuthnDevice.objects.filter(user=request.user).exists():
ak_message("Administrators must enroll a hardware security key (Yubikey)")
return False
return True
```
**Policy: enforce-mfa-users**
```python
# Expression Policy
# Requires any MFA for users
if ak_is_group_member(request.user, name="homelab-users"):
from authentik.stages.authenticator_totp.models import TOTPDevice
from authentik.stages.authenticator_webauthn.models import WebAuthnDevice
has_totp = TOTPDevice.objects.filter(user=request.user, confirmed=True).exists()
has_webauthn = WebAuthnDevice.objects.filter(user=request.user).exists()
if not (has_totp or has_webauthn):
ak_message("Please enroll an MFA device (authenticator app or security key)")
return False
return True
```
#### 4. User Enrollment Flow
1. User logs into Authentik
2. Navigates to Settings → MFA Devices
3. Clicks "Enroll WebAuthn Device"
4. Inserts Yubikey and touches when prompted
5. Names the device (e.g., "Yubikey 5 NFC - Primary")
6. Optionally enrolls backup device or TOTP
## Vaultwarden Configuration
### Current State
Vaultwarden deployment has WebAuthn support built-in. Configuration is done via the admin panel.
### Required Configuration
#### 1. Enable WebAuthn in Admin Panel
Access admin panel at `https://vaultwarden.daviestechlabs.io/admin`:
1. Navigate to **Settings** section
2. Find **Yubikey** settings:
- For WebAuthn/FIDO2: No additional configuration needed (enabled by default)
- For Yubikey OTP: Requires Client ID and Secret Key from Yubico
3. Find **Two-Factor Authentication** or **General** settings:
- Verify WebAuthn is not disabled
4. Click **Save** if any changes made
#### 2. User Setup (WebAuthn)
1. Log into Vaultwarden web vault
2. Go to Settings → Security → Two-step Login
3. Click Manage next to "FIDO2 WebAuthn"
4. Click "Register new key"
5. Insert Yubikey and touch when prompted
6. Name the key (e.g., "Yubikey 5 NFC")
#### 3. Optional: Enable Yubikey OTP
If users want Yubikey OTP as an additional option (the 44-character string feature):
**Step 1: Get Yubico API Credentials**
Visit: https://upgrade.yubico.com/getapikey/
**Step 2: Enter credentials in Admin Panel**
In the Vaultwarden admin panel → Yubikey section:
- Enter **Client ID**
- Enter **Secret Key**
- Click **Save**
Alternatively, for GitOps management:
**Step 2b: Store credentials in Vault**
```bash
vault kv put kv/vaultwarden-yubico \
client_id="YOUR_CLIENT_ID" \
secret_key="YOUR_SECRET_KEY"
```
**Step 3: Create ExternalSecret**
Add to `/home/billy/homelab-k8s2/kubernetes/apps/security/vaultwarden/app/externalsecret.yaml`:
```yaml
---
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: vaultwarden-yubico
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
kind: ClusterSecretStore
name: vault
target:
name: vaultwarden-yubico
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
- secretKey: YUBICO_CLIENT_ID
remoteRef:
key: kv/data/vaultwarden-yubico
property: client_id
- secretKey: YUBICO_SECRET_KEY
remoteRef:
key: kv/data/vaultwarden-yubico
property: secret_key
```
**Step 4: Update Deployment**
Add to `/home/billy/homelab-k8s2/kubernetes/apps/security/vaultwarden/app/deployment.yaml`:
```yaml
envFrom:
- secretRef:
name: vaultwarden-db-credentials
- secretRef:
name: vaultwarden-yubico # Add this
```
**Status:** ⏳ NOT IMPLEMENTED - Requires Yubico API credentials
## MFA Requirements by User Group
| Group | MFA Requirement | Allowed Methods |
|-------|-----------------|-----------------|
| homelab-admins | Required | WebAuthn only |
| homelab-users | Required | WebAuthn or TOTP |
| homelab-guests | Optional | WebAuthn or TOTP |
| pending-approval | Not required | N/A |
## Recovery Procedures
### Lost Yubikey - Authentik
1. Admin accesses Authentik Admin → Directory → Users
2. Find affected user
3. Go to user's MFA Devices tab
4. Delete lost device
5. User can enroll new device on next login
### Lost Yubikey - Vaultwarden
1. User uses backup recovery code (generated at 2FA setup)
2. Or admin accesses Vaultwarden admin panel
3. Users → Find user → Disable 2FA
4. User can re-enable with new device
### Best Practice: Backup Keys
Recommend users enroll:
- Primary Yubikey (carried daily)
- Backup Yubikey (stored securely at home)
- TOTP as fallback (if allowed by policy)
## Supported Yubikey Models
| Model | WebAuthn | NFC | USB-C | Recommended For |
|-------|----------|-----|-------|-----------------|
| Yubikey 5 NFC | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | Mobile + Desktop (USB-A) |
| Yubikey 5C NFC | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | Modern laptops |
| Yubikey 5 Nano | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | Always-in desktop |
| Security Key NFC | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | Budget option |
## Architecture
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ User Login │
└──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Authentik SSO │
│ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ Password │───▶│ WebAuthn │───▶│ Session │ │
│ │ Stage │ │ Validation │ │ Created │ │
│ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────┴──────┐ │
│ │ Yubikey │ │
│ │ Touch │ │
│ └─────────────┘ │
└──────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
│ SSO (no MFA needed again)
┌────────────────────┼────────────────────┐
▼ ▼ ▼
┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ Affine │ │ Nextcloud│ │ Immich │
└──────────┘ └──────────┘ └──────────┘
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Vaultwarden (Separate) │
│ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ │
│ │ Master │───▶│ WebAuthn │───▶│ Vault │ │
│ │ Password │ │ (2FA) │ │ Unlocked │ │
│ └─────────────┘ └──────┬──────┘ └─────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────┴──────┐ │
│ │ Yubikey │ │
│ │ Touch │ │
│ └─────────────┘ │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```
## Testing Checklist
### Authentik WebAuthn
- [ ] Enroll Yubikey as admin user
- [ ] Verify login requires Yubikey touch
- [ ] Test SSO to Affine with Yubikey
- [ ] Test recovery with backup device
- [ ] Verify non-admin can use TOTP instead
### Vaultwarden WebAuthn
- [ ] Enable WebAuthn in admin panel
- [ ] Enroll Yubikey for test user
- [ ] Verify vault unlock requires Yubikey
- [ ] Test with browser extension
- [ ] Test recovery code flow
## Future Enhancements
1. **Passkeys** - Enable passwordless login with resident keys
2. **Conditional access** - Require hardware key for sensitive operations only
3. **Device attestation** - Verify Yubikey authenticity
4. **Session binding** - Bind sessions to hardware key
## References
* [Authentik WebAuthn Documentation](https://docs.goauthentik.io/docs/flow/stages/authenticator_webauthn/)
* [Vaultwarden 2FA Configuration](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-WebAuthn-authentication)
* [WebAuthn Specification](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/)
* [FIDO Alliance](https://fidoalliance.org/)
* [Yubico Developer Program](https://developers.yubico.com/)